Introduction
Information concerning an uncertain quantity is often available from many sources. For example, experts may possess relevant information, past data may be available, and theoretical or empirical models may be used to generate estimates or predictions. To base inferences or decisions on all available information, it is necessary to combine the information from various sources. For convenience the different sources of information will all be labeled experts in this paper, although in practice one or more of the "experts" might represent a prediction from a regression equation or information from some type of source other than a "live expert." The aggregation of information across information sources is thus called the formation of a consensus of experts.
Uncertainty can be represented formally in terms of probability, and the ultimate aim of a consensus procedure is to arrive at a probability distribution for the uncertain quantity of interest. This distribution, which is called a consensus distribution, should fully reflect the information provided by the experts.
The aggregation of information is assumed to be performed by a single individual, who might be a decision maker who has consulted the experts and might even be one of the experts. Of course, the group of experts might act as an individual without an internal or external decision maker to act as arbiter, but this could raise questions about disagreements concerning the consensus procedure and about similar issues that are not within the scope of this paper. In particular, the reaching of a consensus behaviorally through feedback or group interaction is not considered here, although such feedback or interaction before each expert makes a final assessment of probabilities (or other forms of information) is not ruled out.
Various consensus procedures have been suggested for the aggregation of experts' probability distributions, ranging from a simple average of the distributions to a formal Bayesian revision process. For example, see Eisenberg One important feature of information from different sources is the possibility of stochastic dependence, and the model developed here expresses this dependence in terms of dependence among the experts' errors of estimation. Experts often have some common training and experience, they may see the same data, and they may use similar aids (e.g., statistical procedures such as regression analysis). Thus, some sort of dependence among experts' errors of estimation would not be surprising. For example, sportwriters' predicted football point spreads collected for an earlier study were good estimates of the~actual point spreads (Winkler [19] ). An investigation of the correlation of errors of prediction for each possible pair of sportswriters reveals very high positive dependence. Pairwise correlations of sportwriters' errors of prediction in 1966 ranged from 0.84 to 0.97 for professional games (91 games, 10 writers) and from 0.73 to 0.95 for collegiate games (62 games, 13 writers).
Dependence among experts could have a serious impact on consensus distributions, but scant attention has been paid to such dependence in the consensus literature. Dependence is mentioned in Winkler [18] , but the procedure suggested there for handling dependence is strictly ad hoc. Hogarth [7] uses the correlation of experts' point estimates as a factor in determining how many experts should be consulted. Morris [11] develops a Bayesian model that explicitly allows for dependent experts, but he points to dependence as a source of difficulty, stating (p. 687) that "One of the future challenges in the field of expert modeling is the construction of general models of expert dependence."
The objective of this paper is to develop a consensus model which allows formally for dependence among experts while still being reasonably tractable and to study the implications of dependence for the consensus distributions generated by the model. The spirit of the approach taken here is very much that of modeling experts, as in Morris [11] and Lindley, Tversky, and Brown [9] . The general model is presented in ?2 and studied with a normal distribution of estimation errors in ?3. Some brief concluding comments are given in ?4.
A Consensus Model with Dependence
Suppose that the variable of interest, which could be a parameter of a statistical model or a future observation, is denoted by 9. Distributions for 9 are assessed by k experts, and for convenience it is assumed that 9 is real-valued and unbounded and that all k distribution functions are continuous. Expert i's assessed density function is denoted by gi. Thus, gl, . . . , gk are densities over R which represent the judgments of the k experts about 9.
The mean of expert i's distribution, can be thought of as a point estimate of 9. The error of estimation for expert i is then (9), and he discusses the assessment of ci from past data or subjective judgments. Lindley, Tversky, and Brown [9] consider the calibration of an expert's probabilities for events instead of an expert's density function for an uncertain quantity, but much of the discussion is quite germane to the latter problem. DeGroot The implications of the normal model for consensus will be investigated for two cases. In Section 3.2, it will be assumed that I is known (or that a single value is chosen for 5). If the k experts are judged to be calibrated in the sense discussed in ?2, then (ti, ai) can be obtained for i = 1, . . . , k from the experts' assessments, leaving the k(k -1)/2 correlations to be estimated. If calibration is needed, the (ji, a 2)-pairs can be adjusted accordingly. With respect to the correlations, it may be possible to use some simplifying assumptions (e.g., zero or equal correlations). Uncertainty about I can be represented in the form of a prior distribution for X, of course, and this case will be considered in ?3.3.
Consensus with I Known
If the prior density for 9 is an improper diffuse density and u is normal with mean (0, . .. , 0)' and covariance matrix 5, then the posterior density for 9 is h(9 I I) cx ( Assume without loss of generality that oa < 02, so that [, always receives a positive weight in (3.9) but the weight on p2 is negative if p > I/02. In words, a high correlation makes it quite likely that the two estimates will be on the same side of 9, and since the less precise estimate is expected to be further from 9 than the more precise estimate, the former receives a negative weight in an attempt to "shrink" the latter toward 9.
Although As k increases, the number of parameters of I increases rapidly, and it becomes difficult to express I`-in terms of these parameters. In order to study the impact of dependence, it is convenient to assume some special structure for 5. For example, suppose that Pi = p for i, j = 1, . . . , k, i 7# j. Now I can be found from the Binomial Inverse Theorem (Press [13, p. 23] Most of the previous consensus work referenced in ? 1 involves consensus distributions that are mixtures of the experts' distributions. For the example, such a procedure would lead to a consensus distribution that is a mixture of the analysts' three normal distributions rather than a single normal distribution. A mixture can lead to inferences about 9 considerably different from those arrived at via the consensus procedure developed in this section. For instance, the investor may be interested in probabilities such as P(9 > 70). This probability is 0.05 from the consensus distribution with dependence taken into consideration; 0.02 from the consensus distribution assuming independence; 0.08 from a mixture with weights 0.263, 0.669, and 0.068 (the weights used in the determination of [t* in the dependent case); and 0.20 from a mixture with equal weights. A rationale for the mixture form might be the idea that the weight assigned to an analyst represents the probability that his distribution is "correct", or a "true model." But it seems more reasonable to think of the analysts' distributions as simply providing information without bringing in notions such as a "true model" or a "correct assessor." If the model developed in this section provides a good approximation to the information-gathering process, then the appropriate consensus distribution is a single normal distribution, not a mixture. Moreover, if the decision maker has a normal prior distribution for 9 with mean [t and variance a2, then the posterior distribution for 9 is normal with mean (a -2[o + a-2,*)/(a -2 + G*-2) and variance (2 + a*-2)-l.
Consensus with I Not Known
The assumption that I is known is quite strong. However, subjective judgments and past data on estimation errors can be used to determine a prior distribution for :. The inverted Wishart distribution, which is a natural-conjugate prior distribution for the covariance matrix of a normal process, may provide a satisfactory approximation for the distribution of 5. A priori independence of 9 and I seems reasonable, since I relates to the process generating estimation errors, not to the process generating 9. The above results in the football-prediction example are entirely data-based, and the calibration adjustment and the distribution of I can be revised as new data become available. If other information is available, a non-diffuse prior distribution for the calibration parameters and I can be assessed and combined with the data to arrive at a posterior distribution (or used by itself in the absence of data). In the assessment of a prior distribution, the calibration adjustments are probably the easiest parameters to think about, the variances are more difficult, and the correlations are the most difficult to assess. In the assessment of correlations, the requirement that I (or 50) be positive definite must be satisfied. An interactive assessment procedure (e.g., see Kadane et al. [8] ) could have built-in checks to assure a positive-definite matrix. In most cases the correlations would be expected to be positive, with the magnitude depending on the degree of overlap of information among experts. In the football example, for instance, a great deal of public information is available, with relatively little "private" information, and as a result the correlations are very close to one. Situations with more private information than public information might be expected to yield correlations close to zero. An empirical study of correlations among forecast errors in a variety of situations could provide an indication of what magnitudes might be expected for correlations and thereby could make it easier to make assessments concerning correlations in a new situation.
Discussion
The consensus model investigated here formally allows for dependence among experts, and the results obtained demonstrate that the posterior distribution following the observation of the information from the experts may be quite sensitive to the degree of dependence. If the posterior distribution is used as an input to a decisionmaking problem, the resulting decisions may in turn be sensitive to the degree of dependence. Thus, in modeling experts, it is important to take into consideration the possibility of dependence.
Aside from the question of dependence, the general form of the consensus distribution is of interest. In many consensus studies (e.g., Stone [16] ; DeGroot [1] ), a linear combination of the experts' densities is taken as the consensus density. In this paper, no particular form is assumed a priori for the consensus density, and the model leads not to a linear combination, but to a modified product form as in Morris [11] . In the normal model with known A, for example, the consensus distribution is a single normal distribution, not a mixture of normal distributions. The consensus mean in this instance is a linear combination of the experts' means, with the weights relating to the experts' accuracy and dependence via X. Furthermore, with the normal assumptions in
